{"ok":true,"stdout":"{\n  \"review\": \"Adversarial Review\",\n  \"target\": {\n    \"mode\": \"branch\",\n    \"label\": \"branch diff against main\",\n    \"baseRef\": \"main\",\n    \"explicit\": false\n  },\n  \"threadId\": \"01a1786b-a364-76d2-b3d6-50e3c9df60c6\",\n  \"context\": {\n    \"repoRoot\": \"/home/madsc/work/insuniverse-temp/.worktrees/admin-rbac\",\n    \"branch\": \"feat/admin-rbac\",\n    \"summary\": \"Reviewing branch feat/admin-rbac against main from merge-base 3666cd5ac64ec3f379ca146e2d68f9fc97d251ad.\"\n  },\n  \"codex\": {\n    \"status\": 0,\n    \"stderr\": \"\",\n    \"stdout\": \"{\\\"verdict\\\":\\\"needs-attention\\\",\\\"summary\\\":\\\"Do not ship this as M10. Both submodules remain at the plan’s starting commits; the described M10 implementation is absent, and the active credential-edit bypass remains.\\\",\\\"findings\\\":[{\\\"severity\\\":\\\"high\\\",\\\"title\\\":\\\"Active account edits still bypass the planned delegation guardrails\\\",\\\"body\\\":\\\"At server bf0c1db5, update writes the supplied athId and password without checking B1–B4 or expectedVersion. AdminService.updateAdmin only protects the designated superadmin; it does not protect other higher-privilege accounts or reject self-binding changes. An internal administrator admitted to this route can therefore change their own binding or reset another non-superadmin permission manager’s password. This is the existing hole M10 promises to close, but permission-guardrail.ts and its integration are absent from the supplied revision.\\\",\\\"file\\\":\\\"insuniverse-server/apps/api/src/modules/admin/admin.repository.ts\\\",\\\"line_start\\\":139,\\\"line_end\\\":143,\\\"confidence\\\":1,\\\"recommendation\\\":\\\"Provide the implemented M10 submodule revisions. Before these writes, acquire the sentinel lock, validate expectedVersion, and evaluate B1–B4 using locked database state. Verify self-binding escalation and higher-privilege password resets are rejected through the active route.\\\"}],\\\"next_steps\\\":[\\\"Update the review target to commits containing M10, then repeat the authorization, lock-order, CSRF, and frontend review.\\\"]}\",\n    \"reasoning\": []\n  },\n  \"result\": {\n    \"verdict\": \"needs-attention\",\n    \"summary\": \"Do not ship this as M10. Both submodules remain at the plan’s starting commits; the described M10 implementation is absent, and the active credential-edit bypass remains.\",\n    \"findings\": [\n      {\n        \"severity\": \"high\",\n        \"title\": \"Active account edits still bypass the planned delegation guardrails\",\n        \"body\": \"At server bf0c1db5, update writes the supplied athId and password without checking B1–B4 or expectedVersion. AdminService.updateAdmin only protects the designated superadmin; it does not protect other higher-privilege accounts or reject self-binding changes. An internal administrator admitted to this route can therefore change their own binding or reset another non-superadmin permission manager’s password. This is the existing hole M10 promises to close, but permission-guardrail.ts and its integration are absent from the supplied revision.\",\n        \"file\": \"insuniverse-server/apps/api/src/modules/admin/admin.repository.ts\",\n        \"line_start\": 139,\n        \"line_end\": 143,\n        \"confidence\": 1,\n        \"recommendation\": \"Provide the implemented M10 submodule revisions. Before these writes, acquire the sentinel lock, validate expectedVersion, and evaluate B1–B4 using locked database state. Verify self-binding escalation and higher-privilege password resets are rejected through the active route.\"\n      }\n    ],\n    \"next_steps\": [\n      \"Update the review target to commits containing M10, then repeat the authorization, lock-order, CSRF, and frontend review.\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"rawOutput\": \"{\\\"verdict\\\":\\\"needs-attention\\\",\\\"summary\\\":\\\"Do not ship this as M10. Both submodules remain at the plan’s starting commits; the described M10 implementation is absent, and the active credential-edit bypass remains.\\\",\\\"findings\\\":[{\\\"severity\\\":\\\"high\\\",\\\"title\\\":\\\"Active account edits still bypass the planned delegation guardrails\\\",\\\"body\\\":\\\"At server bf0c1db5, update writes the supplied athId and password without checking B1–B4 or expectedVersion. AdminService.updateAdmin only protects the designated superadmin; it does not protect other higher-privilege accounts or reject self-binding changes. An internal administrator admitted to this route can therefore change their own binding or reset another non-superadmin permission manager’s password. This is the existing hole M10 promises to close, but permission-guardrail.ts and its integration are absent from the supplied revision.\\\",\\\"file\\\":\\\"insuniverse-server/apps/api/src/modules/admin/admin.repository.ts\\\",\\\"line_start\\\":139,\\\"line_end\\\":143,\\\"confidence\\\":1,\\\"recommendation\\\":\\\"Provide the implemented M10 submodule revisions. Before these writes, acquire the sentinel lock, validate expectedVersion, and evaluate B1–B4 using locked database state. Verify self-binding escalation and higher-privilege password resets are rejected through the active route.\\\"}],\\\"next_steps\\\":[\\\"Update the review target to commits containing M10, then repeat the authorization, lock-order, CSRF, and frontend review.\\\"]}\",\n  \"parseError\": null,\n  \"reasoningSummary\": []\n}\n","stderr":"","durationMs":59704,"classification":"ok","blocking":false,"advisory":false}